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NOTES
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-HOME RULE CHARTER-
VALIDITY OF CHARTER AMENDMENT AUTHORIZING
PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT AT HARD LABOR FOR
VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
The home rule charter of the city of Lincoln, Nebraska at
one time provided:
In addition to the powers hereinbefore enumerated, the city
shall have power by ordinances:
50. To make all such ordinances, by laws, rules and regulations
not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be expedient,
in addition to the special powers in this article enumerated, to
maintain the peace, good government, and welfare of the city,
its trade, commerce and manufactures, and to enforce all ordin-
ances by imposing forfeitures, and by inflicting fines and penal-
ties for the violation thereof not exceeding one hundred dollars
for any one offense, recoverable with costs, and in default of
payment, to provide for confinement in the city prison or county
jail, with or without hard labor upon the city streets or else-
where, for the benefit of the city, until said judgment and costs
are paid.'
On June 15, 1954 the charter was amended by striking the
italicized portion of the charter and substituting instead:
... providing for imprisonment of those convicted of violations
ihereof at hard labor for a period of not to exceed six months and
to impose forfeitures, fines and penalties...2
This amendment raises the question whether a city has power,
under a home rule charter, to enforce ordinances by providing
for imprisonment at hard labor other than upon a default in pay-
ment of a fine. Determination of this question is dependent upon
two other questions. First, can the power to create a crime be
delegated to a city under a home rule charter, and, if the power
can be delegated, has it been delegated to the city of Lincoln?
I. CAN THE POWER TO CREATE A CRIME BE DELE-
GATED TO A HOME RULE CITY IN NEBRASKA?
Prosecutions under a municipal ordinance are generally re-
garded as civil actions for the recovery of a fine.3 Imprisonment
upon default in payment of such a fine is not considered imprison-
ment for debt, but only as a means of enforcing the order of the
'Lincoln City Charter, Art. II, § 2, g 50 (1949). Emphasis supplied.
2 Not yet in published form, but on file at the office of the Lincoln
city clerk. Emphasis supplied.
3 Peterson v. State, 79 Neb. 132, 112 N.W. 306 (1907); 9 McQuillan,
Municipal Corporations § 27.06 (3d ed. 1949).
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court.4 The statutory charters of all classes of cities, except the
metropolitan class, provide authority to impose imprisonment for
violation of an ordinance only upon default in payment of a fine.5
The reason for the "civil action" doctrine is exemplified by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel Keefe v. Schmiege.6
An ordinance declared certain conduct to be a misdemeanor. The
court argued that a misdemeanor is a crime, and that creation of
a crime is a soveriegn, non-delegable power of the state. Regard-
less of whether or not the Wisconsin court's position that a mis-
demeanor is necessarily a crime is sound reasoning7, the case illu-
strates the theory underlying the doctrine that a prosecution for
violation of an ordinance is a civil action.
In the same case, Wisconsin adopted the position that the
imposition of imprisonment, without a default in payment of a
fine, for the violation of an ordinance was unconstitutional as vio-
lating a provision of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibiting in-
4Neb. Const. Art. I, § 20, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in
any civil action on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud." See
State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345, 174 A.L.R.
1338 (1947).
GNeb. Rev. Stat. § 14-102(25) (metropolitan cities); §§ 15-260, 263
(primary cities); § 16-246 (first class cities); § 17-207 (villages); §
17-505 (villages and second class cities) (Reissue 1954). Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 18-206 (Reissue 1954), however, provides, "If the defendant is found
guilty, the police magistrate shall declare the punishment which, in cases
arising under the ordinances of the city or village, shall be by fine or
imprisonment, or both, and shall render judgment according to law. It
shall be a part of the judgment that the defendant shall stand committed
until the judgment be complied with, and all fines and costs are paid. It
shall be lawful to further provide as part of the judgment, that until such
judgment is complied with and such fines and costs are paid, that the de-
fendant be required to work out said fines and costs upon the public
streets, or at any other place that may be provided, at the rate of two
dollars per day for each day the defendant shall actually work." An in-
terpretation of this law to mean that in rendering "judgment according
to law", the magistrate could impose only such penalty as is provided by
the ordinance, would avoid a conflict with the other statutes cited.
6 251 Wis. 79, 28 N.W.2d 345 (1947).
7The court cites State v. Slowe, 230 Wis. 406, 284 N.W. 4 (1939) for
the proposition that a misdemeanor is a crime. The rationale of the case
does not indicate that an act is made a crime merely because it is called
a misdemeanor. Killing of deer, which was a misdemeanor by statute,
was declared to be a crime under a definition of "crime" which included
"... offenses against the lives and persons of individuals; offenses against
property; offenses against public justice; offenses against public policy .... "
It would seem that it is the substance of an act which is a violation of a
law or ordinance, rather than the name or designation given to the viola-
tion.
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voluntary servitude except as punishment for a crime., The court
did not cite any authority for this position. There is scant au-
thority on the point, but what there is reveals that more than
mere imprisonment is required to constitute involuntary servitude.
Imprisonment "at hard labor" is regarded as involuntary servi-
tude.9 Such punishment upon default in payment of a fine would
be voluntary, rather than involuntary, servitude, since the de-
fendant has the alternative of paying the fine. It can be general-
ized that imprisonment at hard labor which does constitute in-
voluntary servitude can be imposed only as punishment for crime.
The Lincoln charter amendment authorizes the city to enact
ordinances, the violation of which is punishable by a form of in-
voluntary servitude. The charter amendment must grant the city
power to create a crime. To argue that the charter amendment
is therefore unconstitutional because a prosecution under a city
ordinance is a civil instead of a criminal action is to beg the ques-
tion. Whether such an action is civil or criminal depends upon
whether a city may constitutionally exercise the power to create
a crime.
The Wisconsin court held that creation of a crime is a non-
delegable power of the legislature. It is submitted that this dele-
gation should not be unconstitutional.1 0 There is no policy reason
for the rule. It would seem that a city is just as capable of creat-
ing a crime as the legislature.
However, the delegation to a city under a home rule charter
in Nebraska can easily be distinguished from the delegation in
the Schmiege case. In Nebraska the delegation is from the state
constitution, rather than from the state legislature. The Ne-
braska Constitution provides:
s U.S. Const. Amend, XIII; Neb. Const. Art. I, § 2. Each contains an
almost identical prohibition against involuntary servitude.
9 Flannagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa 393, 158 N.W. 641 (1916). A statute
Imposing imprisonment at hard labor for contempt of court was held in-
valid as involuntary servitude, arguing that contempt of court was "in
the nature of but not a crime." The court pointed out that "Imprison-
ment is not involuntary servitude. Labor enforced as a punishment is
involuntary servitude... [therefore] it follows of necessity that the sen-
tence pronounced upon the petitioner and the statutory provision which
authorizes it are both invalid .... " See also State ex rel. Erickson v. West,
42 Minn 147, 43 N.W. 845 (1889).
ioSee St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co, 149 U.S. 465, 467
(1892); 2 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 10.13 (3d ed. 1949).
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Any city having a population of more than five thousand (5000)
inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government, consis-
tent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state.. .11
It cannot then be argued that the delegation of the power to
create a crime to a city under a home rule charter is unconstitu-
tional, if the delegation is from the constitution itself.
II. IS THE POWER TO CREATE A CRIME ACTUALLY
DELEGATED?
The scope of the powers delegated to a home rule city is
limited by the words "for its own government, consistent with and
subject to the constitution and laws of the state." In Axberg v.
City of Lincoln1 2 this language was interpreted to mean that a
city governed under such a charter could:
... provide for the exercise of every power connected with the
proper and efficient government of the municipality where the
legislature has not entered the field. Where the legislature has
enacted a law affecting municipal affairs, but which is also of
state concern, the law takes precedence over any municipal action
under the home rule charter. But where the legislative act deals
with a strictly local municipal concern, it can have no application
to a city which has adopted a home rule charter.
The test to be applied, then, in determining whether power
over a particular matter has been delegated to a city which has
adopted a home rule charter is whether the subject matter is of
strictly local municipal concern, or of state-wide concern. If a
statute is in conflict with a home rule charter or charter amend-
ment, the statute will take precedence over the charter only if the
subject matter of the statute is of state-wide concern. There can
be no doubt that the Lincoln charter amendment is in conflict
with the state statutes. The statutes applicable to cities of the
primary class provide for imprisonment only upon default in pay-
ment of fines13 while Lincoln's charter amendment provides for
imprisonment at hard labor regardless of a default in payment
of fines.
It should be noted that the application of the test of state-
wide concern may be qualified to some extent by the manner in
which the home rule charter is adopted. Article XI, Section 5
11 Neb. Const. Art XI, § 2.
12141 Neb. 55, 58, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942). See also Eppley Hotels Co.
v. City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 276 N.W. 196 (1937); Schroeder v.
Zehrung, 108 Neb. 573, 188 N.W. 237; Axelrod, Home Rule, 30 Neb. L.
Rev. 224 (1950).
13Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-260, 15-263 (Reissue 1954).
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of the Nebraska Constitution provides a means whereby a city
with a population of over 100,000 may adopt its "existing" char-
ter as its home rule charter and may thereafter amend it "sub-
ject to the constitution and laws of the state." In Munch v. Tusa 4
and in Sullivan v. Omaha'5 the court stated:
... even though a subsequent amendment to the home rule charter
may involve a matter of state-wide concern, the field will not be
deemed to have been occupied by legislative act unless such act
came into existence after the adoption of the home rule charter.
The reasoning of these cases is that the charter of Omaha
previous to the adoption of their home rule charter was the "legis-
lative" charter, i.e., the statutes governing cities of the metro-
politan class. To require the Omaha home rule charter to be
subject to the "legislative" charter would vitiate the power of
amendment granted by the constitution. Therefore the city was
free to amend its charter without regard to the statutory charter
as "laws of the state." This doctrine could not, of course, be ap-
plied to laws not a part of the "existing charter" which means
that any changes made in the "legislative" charter by the legisla-
ture after the adoption of the home rule charter would control
as to the home rule charter if their subject matter was of state-
wide concern.
The law of these cases is not applicable to Lincoln, which
adopted its charter pursuant to Article XI, Section 2 of the con-
stitution. Lincoln's charter was framed by a charter convention.
Language in Section 2 that a charter so adopted shall ". . . super-
sede any existing charter and all amendments thereof.. ." ap-
parently has reference to any previous home rule charter. As
illustrated by the Axberg case, the test of state-wide concern con-
tinues to be the test applied to amendments of charters adopted
under Article XI, section 2.
CONCLUSION
In view of the position taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court
that there is "... no sure test which will enable us to distinguish
between matters of strictly municipal concern of those of state
concern," a prediction as to whether or not the Lincoln charter
amendment would be upheld as valid must be necessity be a
guess.16 There is reason to believe, however, that it would be
struck down. In the Axberg case the court, in considering this
problem in relation to firemen's pensions, said:
14140 Neb. 457, 300 N.W. 385 (1941).
15146 Neb. 297, 298, 19 N.W.2d 510 (1945).
i6Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
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Police and fire protection are essential to the administration of
state government. The state must remain soveriegn in all such
affairs else its authorities cannot protect rights assured to its
citizens by its Constitution. These are fundamental reasons why
police, fire and health undertakings are essentially attributes of
state soveriegnty and matters of state-wide concern. Preserva-
tion of order, enforcement of law, protection of life and property,
and the suppression of crime are matters of state-wide concern.17
The control of the judiciary in the exercise of its functions
is of no less importance to the state in the preservation of order,
enforcement of law, and the suppression of crime than is the
matter of pensions to be paid to firemen. In addition, we are
here dealing with the manner in which individuals are deprived
of their liberty. Certainly this matter is of as much importance
to the state as the manner in which persons are deprived of their
property.
It is therefore submitted that the power of a home rule city
to create a crime by imposing imprisonment at hard labor is a
matter of state-wide concern, and that the Lincoln charter amend-
ment is invalid as conflicting with the laws of the state.18
Clark Nichols, Jr., '56
17 Ibid.
IS If the subject of this amendment is not a matter of statewide con-
cern, and the amendment is held valid, a prosecution for violation of an
ordinance for which imprisonment at hard labor is imposed must be tried
under criminal procedure. Lincoln city authorities indicated that no
change would result in their prosecutions for ordinance violations, since
it is apparently the practice of Lincoln judges to require a criminal burden
of proof. The power of the city to appeal such cases, however, might be
seriously affected.
